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An explanation of factors related to the acquiring firm’s 
abnormal returns from M&A activities 
By Xia Zhangliang 
Abstract 
This paper firstly estimates the abnormal returns from merger and acquisition 
activities. To obtain the abnormal returns, I used the S&P500, which is considered as 
market return, and firm returns to calculate the normal returns. The excess returns can 
be regarded as abnormal returns. Secondly, I performed a regression analysis to test 
the relationship between abnormal returns and explanatory factors. This paper 
examines these relationships and provides suggestions to companies which would 
participate in merger and acquisition activities. 
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1.1 Background  
One of the ways to increase the value of a firm is to accumulate the earnings, but 
it will take a long period, like decades. However, there is a more efficient way which 
includes Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). This strategy can grow the firm rapidly 
compared to the reinvestment long-run strategy.  
Companies over the past hundred years or so have participated in merger and 
acquisition activities to increase market power or other business strategies. An 
acquisition can be defined as a transaction that one company, called the acquirer, uses 
cash and/or stocks to buy a substantial part or all of the assets or stocks of a target 
firm. Takeovers, including cross border, are the most general M&A activity in the 
global economy. Normally the transactions are that the acquirers buy a specific 
division or all the voting shares of the target firm.  
After the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the global economy passed the trough stage 
and entered into an expansion stage. The takeover boom returned as a preferred 
strategy compared to building a new division, because of its potential low cost.  
There were a total of 178,199 deals of mergers and acquisitions that have 
happened since January 1st, 2010. Most of that deals (154,959) were completed with 





America 44% were public deals, with 151 deals being in the technology industry. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To analyze the abnormal returns from merger and acquisition activities 
from 2010 to 2014 and how much shareholders wealth was created as a 
result. 
2. To analyze the correlation between the profitability of the target firm and 
the abnormal returns from the M&A activity. 
3. To measure the size effect to the abnormal returns from the M&A activity. 
4. To measure the payment method (cash, stock) effect to the abnormal 
returns from the M&A activity. 
5. To measure the impact of the liquidity of the target firm to the abnormal 
returns from the M&A activity. 
6. To evaluation whether the intangible assets will affect the abnormal returns 
from the M&A activity in the technology industry. 
1.3 Limitations of the research 
Because of the data limitations, when testing the correlation between the factors 
and abnormal returns, many indicators cannot be used, such as ROE, debt to equity 
ratio. Another limitation is the payment type. For a single type of the payment, such as 





model. However, for some transactions, both cash and stock were used, so one cannot 
use a dummy variable to imply these payment types. So when testing the effect of 
payment type, I eliminated the transactions that paid both cash and stock. 
1.4 Structure of the research 
This chapter has introduced the background of mergers and acquisitions activity, 
the objectives and the limitations of this research. Chapter 2 reviews the previous 
literature which tests the abnormal returns and the factors that result in the abnormal 
returns on the M&A field. Chapter 3 explains the data sources and the research 
methodology. In Chapter 4 I examine the results of the regression analysis and the last 














2.1 Why companies participate in merger and acquisition activities. 
Zhang, (2012) states that with the development of the global economy, the 
competition among various industries has intensified, including the high-tech sector, 
which is a capital, labour and technology. High-tech companies are the symbol of 
national pride, especially the well-known company like Apple. And the whole 
technology industry plays a crucial role in the strength and competitiveness of a 
country. However, when the competition goes fiercer, it is tough to remain as a single 
company. Therefore, mergers and acquisitions become a preferred strategy compared 
to accumulating the earnings by themselves to achieve synergies such as economies of 
scale and scope. (Zhang, 2012). 
Yan, (2013) suggests that the accumulation of internal resources and the 
absorption of external resources are two ways to grow an enterprise. M&A is the most 
popular external form, and the advantage is that it enables enterprises to grow rapidly. 
He concludes that the condition of using M&A to grow a company, there must be a 







2.2 The relationship between synergy and abnormal returns 
Huyghebaert and Luypaert, (2013) suggest that the abnormal returns during an 
merger and acquisition announcement period are caused by the potential synergies. To 
test whether synergies and abnormal returns are related, they calculated direct 
measures of financial synergies, as well as operational synergies, based on the 
consolidated financial statements of the acquirer companies and the industry peer 
groups before and after M&A. They found that the operating synergies are mostly 
created by cutting down investment expenditures.  
In the 1990’s, the cost-based synergies and the revenue-enhancement synergies 
are very important for acquirer companies when they consider whether to conduct 
acquisition activities. Their results showed that the sales growth rate of acquirer firms 
were reasonably larger than the expectations. At the same time, the acquirer firms also 
integrated their business quickly. The operating costs decreased an extra 1.53% as 
percentage of sales compared to their estimates. Because of merger activity, the 
default risk of the combined firm decreased, which meant that they could increase 
long-term debt and they could increase their economies of scale by issuing more debt. 
This research showed that the synergies are positively correlated with the abnormal 







2.3 Event study  
Chang and Tsai (2013) state that the average cumulative abnormal return of all 
acquirers is 0.013 on day 0, which is the announcement day. The highest cumulative 
abnormal return after the merger and acquisition announcement is 0.021 from day 0 to 
day 2. The cumulative abnormal returns near the mergers and acquisitions 
announcement are positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
Which means the investors can obtain positive abnormal return, on average, in the 
short-run. However, when they extended the cumulative abnormal return test period, 
they found that it became insignificant at the 60th day and negative at day 252 at the 
1% significance level. They conclude that there are positive abnormal returns in the 
short-run but negative abnormal returns in the long-run for acquirers. This is 
consistent with the over-confidence of investors and the correction of the market.  
Richard (2006) argued that if investors expect a wild range of M&A activities to 
create positive synergies, then they can obtain positive abnormal returns from merger 
announcements. When more investors expect the mergers are based on an optimistic 
scenario rather than based on reality, the returns of stock in the short-run may be 
boosted, but this will be reversed in the long-run. He gave another point why the 
abnormal returns in the long-run are negative namely that if the manager is rewarded 
by the company because of good performance in short-run, they probably will be 





managerial motivations and incentives are reasons that the abnormal returns are 
positive in the short-run response to merger and acquisition announcements, but 
negative in the long-run. (Richard, 2006) 
The results of Shah & Arora (2014) shows different results. Their hypothesis test 
results fail to reject the null hypothesis that there are no abnormal returns from 
mergers and acquisitions. This indicates that there is no increase in value for the 
shareholders of an acquirer company. They generated p-values for different event 
windows. The average p-values for all event windows (32.8%) show the probability 
of don’t reject the null hypothesis that the M&A announcements don’t create value for 
acquirer shareholders is very high. Hence, the tests were run at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. All the test fail to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that 
announcements do not affect the value of acquirer shareholders. They also used a t-
test, and all the t-statistic value for all event windows do not lie in the reject region of 
the normal distribution graph and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These results 
are similar with the earlier studies, Swaminathan et al. (2008) and Chakraborty 
(2010), who found that the acquirer firm is exposed to high risks from acquisition 
transactions.  
2.4 The factors related to the abnormal returns 
2.4.1 Size effect 





divestiture activities of 1305 firms from the Value Line service. From 1990 to 1999, 
their results showed that the majority of these 1305 companies created wealth by 
acquisition and divestiture activities. For combined bidding firms and target stock 
price, the announcement achieved an average target return of about 20 percent in 3 
day event windows with slightly insignificant negative bidder returns. They find that 
the total returns are significantly related to the ratio which divided the target value by 
transaction value. They concluded that the size effect is a direct reason of the wealth 
created by acquisitions activities. Their results are coincident with some other studies. 
For example, Andrade et al. (2001) and Jensen and Ruback. (1983). 
 
2.4.2 Payment method of mergers and acquisitions 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) explained that the asymmetric information 
approach argues that managers of acquiring firms preferred to use stock as payment 
when their stock is overvalued, as this result in a lower cost. However, we can pose 
the question, why would the managers of target firms accept overvalued stock? They 
suggest two reasons. The first is that they expect to leave the firm soon, so they don’t 
care about whether the stock is over or undervalued. Another one is that the acquirer 
managers would compensate them when the deal is completed, such as, keeping them 
in the same position and or pay them compensation. Travlos (1987) argues using stock 





a cash deal is a positive signal by the target firm. 
 Chang (1998) found a positive abnormal return for the acquiring shareholders 
from acquisitions by stock. This phenomenon was explained by the controlling 
counterbalance by blockholder. The target firm would like to accept the acquirer’s 
stock if their valuation to the acquirer firm is positive. Officer et al. (2009) explain 
that using stock allows acquirers to deliver some risk to the target shareholders, 
especially when the target firms are difficult to value, such as private firm. This is also 
one determinant of the positive abnormal return from the merger and acquisition. 
Feito-Ruiz et al. (2015) suggest that their research differs from others which paid 
more attention on the use of stock as a payment. They found that the cumulative 
abnormal returns of acquirers from mergers and acquisitions announcements which 
used cash are positive and greater than the announcement paid by stock. This holds 
for when the ultimate shareholder of the acquirer has only less than 10% ownership or 
the acquirer’s headquarters are in a country with high shareholder protection, self-
shareholder protection, creditor protection and high levels of KKZ index. This index 
is calculated as the average of six indicators for each country, including political 
stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability in the political system, rule of 
law, government effectiveness and control of corruption.  
The higher level of ownership concentration, the less probability of paying cash 





in an acquirer’s country. Normally, a major reason that acquirers choose to pay by 
cash is because they feel that is a way to avoid diluting their ownership. But for the 
concentrated ownership acquirer companies, they don’t perceive to be paid by cash as 
a way to avoid diluting the ownership of the company. So, for these kind of acquirer 
companies, the reason they choose to pay cash is that they have a high expectation of 
the synergies from the merger this merger and acquisition. 
2.4.3 Liquidity of target firm 
Fuller et al. (2002) performed research into the excess returns achieved by 
acquiring firms. They state that the acquisition activity in a relatively illiquid market 
will give bargaining power to the buyers. As a result the acquirer firm’s assets will 
have a liquidity discount and the shareholders of the acquiring firm will benefit from 










Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 Abnormal returns from Merger and Acquisition activities 
At first, I introduce the methodology part of event study to obtain the abnormal 
returns from mergers and acquisitions activities. This methodology can provide an 
estimation of expected synergies by the announcement.  
Event studies are based on an assumption that the financial market is semi-strong 
form efficient, which means that the price and return reflect all publicly available 
information. So I can estimate the normal returns without mergers and acquisitions 
activity by the pre-event window. After that, I can use the normal returns to calculate 
the excess returns during the event window which is cumulative abnormal return. 
Testing for significance: 
I will test whether the average abnormal return of each stock is statistically 
different from zero. 







⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ 3.1. 
If the t value of test is larger than 1.96 or smaller than -1.96, then the average 
abnormal return of the stock is significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance 
level. The 95% distribution of value from the standard normal distribution with zero 





3.1.2 Testing of the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and the 
factors covered in Chapter 2 
From statistical theories, the test results should follow a normal distribution. I 
chose 51 mergers and acquisitions transactions to be my sample, and use regression 
analysis to test the correlation between cumulative abnormal returns and the 
explanatory factors previously discussed. 
3.2 Data collection 
I used the WRDS and Bloomberg databases to gather the data of completed 
mergers and acquisitions transactions for high-tech firms in North America in the 
period 2010-2014. In order to collect all data listed before, I selected criteria to choose 
the sample. First, the industry chosen is technology. Second, the bidder and target 
firms are all public companies in North America. Third, the transaction payment 
method is only cash or shares (no mixed payment). As mentioned earlier, since I 
choose a dummy variable to identify the payment method, it is hard to identify a 
mixed payment and especially the proportion of each kind of payment.   
Table 3.1. Annual distribution of Mergers and Acquisitions Sample. 
YEAR N % 
2010 13 25.49% 
2011 10 19.61% 
2012 10 19.61% 
2013 11 21.57% 
2014 7 13.72% 







4.1 Cumulative abnormal return from merger and acquisition 
announcements 
In this section, I examine the market initial reactions to merger and acquisition 
announcements and I use cross sectional analysis to do this.  
At first, I chose the time interval of 60 to 30 days before the mergers and 
acquisitions event date to be the estimation window. Then, I selected five days after 
the announcement to be the event window. Combining the stock return and market 
return during the estimation window, I could predict the normal return at the event 
window. Comparing the actual stock returns and predicted normal returns, the 
differences were abnormal returns. Adding them up, finally I obtain the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) 




where ret is the actual stock return of each stock, the predicted return is the 









Table 4.1. Regression results of abnormal returns 
DAY Returns 
 Means Max Min 
0 -0.00000993 -.1481516 -.1481516 
 (.0378106)   
1 .0032002 .1385266 -.0900588 
 (.0327086)   
2 -.0049008 .0871215 -.1296519 
 (.0318232)   
3 .0047858 .1017047 -.0794512 
 (.0244478)   
4 .000556 .0802717 -.0286363 
 (.0180186)   
CAR .0036312 .2301502 -.2914565 
 (.078247)   
Test value 2.230781 6.827696 .0563119 
 (1.695781)   
The t-test value is 2.23 which is larger than 1.96. This result shows that the 5 
days cumulative average abnormal return is significantly different from zero at the 
95% confidence level. 
From the event study, I calculated that the average cumulative abnormal return 
for each company is 0.36%. These returns are five trading days after the mergers and 








4.2 The correlation between profitability of target firm and abnormal 
returns from M&A activities 
For an enterprise, it should create positive synergies by absorbing a profitable 
department. So in this section, I will test if this assumption is true, and if so, what is 
the correlation between the abnormal return and the profitability of the target firm. 
To test this relationship, I chose indicators to perform the regression. At first, I 
used the cumulative average abnormal returns calculated in Equation 4.1. Next, I 
decided to use ROA, ROE and the PE ratio to stand for the profitability of the target 
firm. ROA and ROE are the indicators used by other researchers to show the 
profitability of a firm traditionally. The PE ratio is price divided by earnings per share, 
which is also an indicator of the profitability of a firm. 
Table 4.2. The regression results. 













From the regression results, the coefficients of ROA and PE ratio are positive, 
but they are too small, and the t-value are smaller than 1.96. As a result there is no 





returns can be proven. The coefficient of ROE is negative and significantly different 
from zero. This shows a negative relationship between the abnormal returns and 
profitability of a target firm. The reason why the relationship is negative is that when 
the target firm has ‘good’ profitability, the shareholders of the target firm will expect 
more returns to sell their shares to the acquirer. So they will require more of a 
premium. Thus, the acquirers will not benefit from the good profitability of target firm 
in this acquisition. Compared to ROE, the ROA contains the returns to debtholders. 
This is why shareholders care more about ROE. So the indicator, ROA, cannot show a 
statistically significant result. 
 
4.3 Size effect and abnormal returns of M&A activities 
The previous studies have examined that the wealth created by mergers and 
acquisitions activities is significantly related to the target value divided by transaction 
value, which is the premium of the transaction.  
In this section, I will test the relationship between wealth created and other 
relative size effects.  
At first, I use the ratio of the target firm value to acquirer firm value. When a big 
company acquires a small company, the management of the acquirer firm can decide 
on the strategy of the combined firm which could indicate allowing the managers of 





Even for the target part, the management efficiency will increase, because the 
management skills of the acquirer firm’s manager are more developed. However, if 
the merger and acquisition deal occurred between two companies which have similar 
market capitalization, the operating efficiency will almost be reduced. From earlier 
empirical studies, we know that there is a negative relationship between operating 
efficiency and the changing of management. The more similar their size, the more an 
agency problem will happen. So I make an assumption that the target market 
capitalization to acquirer’s market capitalization ratio is negatively related to the 
abnormal returns from merger and acquisition activities. The second ratio is deal size 
to acquirer firm value. The results are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 







                                                                                           
                    _cons     .0031318   .0025611     1.22   0.227     -.002015    .0082785
target_mc_to_acquiring_mc    -.0141664   .0082033    -1.73   0.090    -.0306516    .0023188
                                                                                           
                     CAAR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
       Total    .012245193        50  .000244904   Root MSE        =    .01535
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0381
    Residual    .011542691        49  .000235565   R-squared       =    0.0574
       Model    .000702502         1  .000702502   Prob > F        =    0.0905
                                                   F(1, 49)        =      2.98
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        51





Table 4.4 Regression Results 
 
From my test results, the coefficient of target market capitalization to acquirer’s 
market capitalization is negative and statistically significant. The t-value is equal    
-1.73 and the p-value is 0.09, which means that the coefficient of target market 
capitalization to acquirer’s market capitalization is different from zero at the 90% 
confidence level.  
 
4.4 Influence of payment method and abnormal returns from M&A 
From previous empirical studies, I have found that the payment method is a 
signal of asymmetric information. If the acquirer’s management is concerned that the 
actual stock price of target firm is not fully reflecting the intrinsic value of company, 
they prefer a cash offer. This is because they believe the stock price will improve 
under their management, and the acquirer’s shareholders will derive more benefit than 
being acquired by stock. But if they think the target firm was overvalued, then their 
will prefer a stock exchange offer to share risk with the target shareholders.  
                                                                                          
                   _cons     .0023869   .0026973     0.88   0.381    -.0030335    .0078074
deal_size_to_acquirer_mc    -.0076787   .0072873    -1.05   0.297    -.0223231    .0069657
                                                                                          
                    CAAR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
       Total    .012245193        50  .000244904   Root MSE        =    .01563
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0022
    Residual    .011973876        49  .000244365   R-squared       =    0.0222
       Model    .000271317         1  .000271317   Prob > F        =    0.2972
                                                   F(1, 49)        =      1.11
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        51





In addition, these two payment offers have different tax purposes. Cash offers 
will create tax obligations for target shareholders and increase the depreciation 
expense to the acquirers. Stock offers are technically tax-free transactions. The target 
shareholders will only realize a capital gain when they sell the stock, which means 
their tax obligations are deferred. Due to the difference of tax treatment, the premium 
of acquisition is higher in the case of a cash payment compared to a stock payment. 
This will affect the abnormal return from mergers and acquisitions activities. 
As covered in Chapter 3, I chose to use dummy variables to indicate the payment 
method of acquisitions. Dummy payment equals 1 if it is a cash offer and 0 if it is a 
stock offer. 
Table 4.5 Regression results (dummy variable) 
 
The regression results show that cash payments have a positive effect on 
abnormal returns from mergers and acquisitions activities and for use of the stock 
payment method, the opposite. 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0061428   .0051573    -1.19   0.239    -.0165068    .0042211
dummy_payment      .008341   .0056831     1.47   0.149    -.0030795    .0197615
                                                                               
         CAAR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .012245193        50  .000244904   Root MSE        =    .01547
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.0226
    Residual     .01172954        49  .000239378   R-squared       =    0.0421
       Model    .000515654         1  .000515654   Prob > F        =    0.1486
                                                   F(1, 49)        =      2.15
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =        51





4.5 Influence of target liquidity and abnormal returns from M&A 
Previous research has examined that when a company acquire a private firm, the 
liquidity of the target will affect the deal price. The liquidity discount will increase for 
firms with lower liquidity. Nevertheless, how about a public company? When 
acquirers take over a public company with low liquidity and solvency, it may cost a 
large part of cash flows to improve the operation of the target firm. 
From the regression analysis, I obtained a positive, but insignificant coefficient 
of debt to assets ratio, and the R-squared is 0.0275, which means this sample cannot 
examine the relationship between DA ratio and abnormal returns from M&A 
activities. The t-value of beta is 1.18, the p-value is 0.245.  
 
4.6 Effect of target intangible assets and abnormal returns from 
M&A 
In accounting terms, intangible assets include patents, trademarks, goodwill, 
franchise rights and some other costs the company incurred for providing future 
profits. Normally, patents, trademarks and goodwill are three of the most common 
intangible assets in a company’s balance sheet. 
Goodwill is the excess of purchase price over the fair value of the company’s 
equity in an acquisition. Thus, it can also be considered that the acquirer can earn 





Patents are an important resource to the high-tech industry. In 2011, Google 
announced that they took over Motorola. The most attractive part for Google was 
Motorola’s patents. After the transaction, Google received 12500 authorized patents 
and 7500 patent applications, which can give Google more competitive power.  
So “intangible assets” is an important part to be considered when the bidding 
firm makes an M&A offer. But it is hard to define how do intangible assets affect the 
transaction.  
I used cumulative average abnormal returns and intangible assets to total assets 
of target firm perform the regression. The results are presented into Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Regression results 
Variables Coef. T-test P-value 
Intercept 0.001364 0.49 0.627 
IATA -0.0045368 -0.38 0.709 
where IATA is Intangible Assets to Total Assets of target firm. The results show a 
negative but insignificant relationship between the abnormal returns and the 











In this paper, I tested the relationship between abnormal returns of bidding firms 
from merger and acquisition activities and many explanatory factors. I found that 
during the period 2010 to 2014, the acquirer companies obtained annualized abnormal 
returns of 18.3% during five trading days after the announcement date on average in 
North America. Many factors can affect the abnormal returns of acquirers. First, the 
profitability of target firm is negatively correlated to the abnormal returns of 
acquirers. Second, a cash offer has a positive effect on the abnormal returns. Third, 
the larger the difference between firm size of target and acquirer, the greater the 
abnormal returns. Finally, the larger proportion of intangible assets to total assets of 
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